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Felt-quality and Attitudinal Accounts of 
Pleasure and Pain in Ancient Greek and 
Contemporary Philosophy
Matthew Usher
A problem that emerges when analysing the arguments for and against hedonism is 
that each side has its own conception of the nature of pleasure and pain and paradig-
matic examples which support their own argument. In this paper, I examine a disa-
greement that can be observed back in the arguments of the philosophers of classical 
Greek period, as to whether pleasures and/or pains are essentially feelings or more like 
propositional attitudes. I suggest Plato’s arguments in the Philebus are in accord with 
current thinking in this area, and push away from subjectivist conceptions of the good 
towards those that are objectivist.
In Athens, in what we call the classical period, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and many of 
their contemporaries discussed and argued about the nature of time and space, iden-
tity and change, good and evil, the sorts of things which are familiar as philosophical 
topics. But they also explored the notion of the “Good Life”, arguing about the (neces-
sary and sufficient) conditions for a life being good in itself, for the one who lives it. 
The topic in many respects defines the philosophical focus of Hellenistic period in 
the work of Epicurus, and of the Stoics. Investigations into the good life are important 
for deliberations in moral philosophy, and the concept of individual welfare is central 
to theories of rationality, and arguments about the ideal society.
There are a number of proposed answers to the question, of what makes a life a 
good life, that have been argued by philosophers resulting in a plethora of positions 
such as hedonism, eudaimonism (happiness/fulfilment), desire-satisfaction, and 
perfectionism, to name a few which have ancient pedigrees and have proved resilient 
and flexible enough to still be argued today. Hedonism, an ancient species of which 
I shall shortly look at, despite attracting deserved criticism both then and today, is 
resilient because despite its problems, it has at its core, some good arguments about 
the ultimate value of pleasure in a good life. While hedonism as a subjectivist account 
of the good in its strong (default) form can be criticised for claiming that nothing 
matters prudentially to an individual except the quality of experience, the weaker 
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form that claims only that an individual’s welfare is in part dependent upon a mental 
state, cannot be so easily dismissed.
For philosophers who recognise the value of pleasure but none the less argue that 
it cannot be the ultimate measure of the good life, such as Plato, one of the responses 
to hedonism has been to posit an objectivist conception of the good and to challenge 
the underlying conceptions of the nature of pleasure and pain that the subjectivists 
employ. And so a problem that emerges when analysing the arguments of both sides in 
that each side has its own conception of the nature of pleasure and pain, and definitive 
examples which support their own argument. Of the many deep disagreements about 
the nature of pleasure and pain, whether pleasures and/or pains are “brute” feelings 
(the conception favoured by subjectivists) or, conative states like attitudes towards 
sensations and propositions (a conception favoured by objectivists), is a significant 
issue that has generated a lot of work.
Preliminaries
Due to the complexity in this area, we are often forced to talk and argue about pleas-
ant, unpleasant, and painful experiences loosely, as though despite their very diverse 
causes and objects, they are all the same, in that they share something essential. And 
yet, on deeper analysis we talk and argue as though there are marked differences 
between them, and to try to distinguish bodily pleasures from mental (emotional) 
pleasures, as well as bodily pains from non-bodily pains, and both, from unpleas-
ures. Sometimes, and henceforth, the term “bodily” is replaced by “sensory”, and so 
we have sensory pleasures and pains, and non-sensory pleasures and pains, sensory 
unpleasures, and non-sensory unpleasures.
Sensory pleasure is the kind we feel when we undergo sensory experiences such as 
taste, smell, touch, etc., examples may include pleasures such as receiving a massage, a 
warm bath, the taste of chocolate, and perhaps quintessentially, the orgasm. Examples 
of sensory unpleasures may include vomiting, nausea, and itching. Sensory pain is 
just paradigmatic pain, it’s the pain from burns, cuts bruises and other assaults upon 
the body. It is typically argued that sensory pleasure and sensory pain are opposites, 
but some argue that pleasure’s opposite is unpleasure, and find examples that support 
this contention such as the relation between the pleasure of eating and the nausea of 
eating too much, and point to the fact that we have a specialised sensory system for 
pain, but no such equivalent for pleasure (Massin, 2014; Hardcastle, 2014).
Mental or emotional pleasures and pains are taken to be non-sensory, in that they 
seem essentially to involve beliefs, judgments, and attitudes like hopes and fears, and 
any sensory component that may be present is deemed trivial. Examples may include 
the pleasure of owning a prestige car, hearing about the saving of an endangered 
species, or of the rise in value of financial investments. And mutatis mutandis some 
have argued for treating grief, shame, anxiety and guilt, etc., as non-sensory pains 
(emotional or mental pain), or at least as cases of non-sensory unpleasures.
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It can appear that we use different words for sensory and non-sensory pleasures 
and pains; I “enjoy” the taste of X, means the taste of X is pleasant whereas if I say 
I am “pleased” with the taste of the X, it suggests the taste of X may be enjoyed for 
reasons other than its taste. Once we start considering the intentional objects of 
pleasures and pains, it gets obscure, and it is not clear whether those terms capture 
any real distinctions between pleasures and pleasures and pains and pains.1 Also 
there is what gets called by neurophysiologists, “top-down modulation” in which 
the psychological appreciation of the significance of the feeling, smell, or taste might 
affect the sensory experience itself rendering it pleasant or unpleasant in a sensory 
sense (Bain & Brady, 2014:3.1).
In this paper, if I say pleasure is a sensory pleasure if its subject experiences the 
pleasure primarily due to undergoing some sensory qualities in a sensory experience, 
and mutatis mutandis of pain, it will be good enough for present purposes. Although 
as I have intimated this distinction is roughshod and glosses over some potentially 
significant problems, it is up to the task, and may, in turn, settle some of other issues 
glossed over or left unresolved. When thinking about pain at least, the distinction 
between sensory and non-sensory appears much less of a problematic, as it’s taken 
as granted that pains, like cuts, burns, bruises, and breaks, all of which have rich sen-
sory dimensions, are the clearest examples of sensory experiences. Even if you want 
to argue, as many have and do, that extreme emotional experiences and nausea and 
other unpleasures are essentially pains, there is nonetheless a much starker difference 
between the sensory ones and the latter, in that only the former pains have the brutal 
pain sensations that include other locatable qualitative sensory characteristics, such 
as piercing, burning, and aching (Usher, 2012).
So with regards to sensory pleasure and (especially) sensory pain, in contemporary 
arguments on this topic, it is argued by some that both are essentially feelings often 
called sensations, that are internal to the pleasant or painful experiences. By internal it 
is meant that the pleasantness or painfulness is an essential part of the phenomenology 
of the respective experience (Aydede, 2014:21). In the literature, these theories are 
called felt-quality theories because they take both pleasure and pain to be, in essence, 
a distinctive feeling or a hedonic tone in the sensations.2 Regardless of which, feeling 
or tone, both argue that the pleasantness/painfulness has a phenomenological reality 
that has a detectable occurrence in our sensory experiences. Sensory pleasures of the 
1 An excellent examination of this problem can be found in Williams, 1966.
2 Aydede, 2014:121, cites Summer, 1996, and Crisp, 2006, for using “externalist” and “ínternalist”, and 
Carson, 2000, and Heathwood, 2007, as using “attitudinal” and “felt-quality”. Fred Feldman, is cited 
as making the distinction between “hedonic-tone” and “distinctive feeling” (Feldman, 1997). G. E. 
Moore is cited as being one of the few to hold a distinctive feeling line (Moore, G. E., 1903/1983:12). 
The hedonic-tone account can be found in Crisp, 2006, see also Shelly Kagan, “Recognition of the 
qualitative differences between the experiences of hiking, listening to music, and reading philosophy 
need not call into question our ability to identify a single dimension-pleasure-along which they vary 
only in magnitude” (Kagan, 1992:72).
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kinds I have mentioned and especially sensory pain (paradigmatic pain) are their best 
and strongest examples.
But there has long been an opposing tradition, which has argued that sensory 
pleasure and even pain, are in fact composites of sensory and cognitive components, 
and it is the cognitive (conative) component that is taken to be essential. Again, follow-
ing the literature, I will call these positions attitudinal, because they take the essence 
of pleasure to be external to the sensation, and instead constituted by a conative or 
evaluative pro-attitude (Aydede, 2014:121). The nature of the attitude has broadly 
been reduced to desiring (preferring, or liking) a sensation or sensory experience, 
and the same, mutatis mutandis, applies to pain and other unpleasures, which are also 
reduced to a conative or evaluative attitude (desiring not, avoiding, disliking, etc.).
Both the felt-quality and the attitudinal accounts have ancient pedigrees. I shall 
look first at Aristippus and the Cyrenaics, who I take as holders of the felt-quality 
view, and then at Plato, who clearly articulates an example of the attitudinal concep-
tion in his dialogue Philebus.3
Aristippus and the Cyrenaics
A contemporary of Socrates and Plato was Aristippus (born c. 435 BCE–died c. 356 BCE), 
the first of the Cyrenaic school, and the famous proponent of the sort of unabashed 
hedonism of the “wine, women, and song” variety that scandalised their contem-
poraries and others ever since. Since we don’t have a body of work from him as we 
do for Plato and Aristotle, and some of the scandalous stories attributed to him are 
possibly unfair and untrue, it might be thought he is an unsuitable candidate to be a 
representative of this position. Instead, it could be argued we should look at the argu-
ment of Eudoxus, a respected philosopher in Plato’s Academy, who had argued that 
pleasure is the chief good on premises including; all things, rational and irrational, 
aim at pleasure; animals aim at what they believe to be good; and that pleasure isn’t 
sought as a means to something else, but as an end in its own right.4 However, on the 
question at hand, we do not know what Eudoxus thought or argued with regard to the 
nature of pleasure and pain, but it would (for reasons that I hope shall shortly become 
clear) naturally align with the Cyrenaic view. Hence, I place them all in the philo-
sophical and folk tradition that conceives of pleasures and pains as being essentially 
brute-feelings (without any content) and therefore as taking a felt-quality conception.5
3 I have followed the normal convention of referring to passages in Plato, which is to refer to the page 
numbers and column letter of the standards edition of Plato, edited by Stephanus.
4 A fuller rendering of Eudoxus’ argument and a description of his character can be found in book 10 of 
the Nicomachean Ethics (1172b10–1173a15).
5 We don’t have much primary material on Aristippus and the Cyrenaics to analyse, and the distinctions 
(if there are any) between his arguments and those of the school he inspired so I can only take a rough 
and ready picture and appeal to a number of important points/themes found in Diogenes Laertius’ 
(henceforth DL and cited according to convention), Lives of Eminent Philosophers Book II Part 8 65–93.
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It is claimed by Diogenes Laertius that when the Cyrenaics argued that pleasure 
is the end or the goal of life they did not mean pleasure in general, or pleasure over 
the long term, but immediate, particular pleasures. This is because they held that 
pleasures do not differ from one another, one pleasure is not more pleasant than 
another, and pleasure is good even if it comes from unseemly things. So when, in an 
apparent contradiction they say that bodily pleasures are better than other pleasures 
(the pleasures of the mind), we should interpret that as a preference for the immedi-
ately and easily obtainable pleasures of bodily gratification over, for example, more 
sophisticated, complex, and time and effort consuming pleasures of the mind. The 
arguments were apparently premised upon a sceptical epistemology; it being impos-
sible to know anything beyond one’s immediate sensations amongst which pleasure 
and pain were the most prominent (DL II 8 86–90).
Like Eudoxus, the Cyrenaics are reported to have argued that the proof that pleas-
ure is the chief good is that we are from our childhood attracted to it without any 
deliberate choice of our own; and that when we have obtained it, we do not seek 
anything further. And again like Eudoxus they made a point of how there is nothing 
which we avoid so much as we do its opposite, which is pain. But perhaps in disa-
greement with the “sober and respectable” Eudoxus, they also asserted that pleasure 
is good, even if it arises from the unbecoming, the absurd and even immoral causes 
(DL II 8 88–89).6
I think the pleasures of bodily gratification, Diogenes says the Cyrenaics lauded, 
epitomise the felt-quality conception of pleasure and pain I defined earlier. And 
I think it is implicit in other hedonists’ arguments like that of Eudoxus’. This con-
ception seems to recognise no difference between the pleasure received from very 
diverse causes of pleasure, no appreciation of the truth, value and ethics of what 
is enjoyed. Put simply, on the feeling conception, to have a pleasure is to have a 
conscious experience which has a unique phenomenal character qua pleasure, and 
which we desire and is therefore valuable for itself; and the same mutatis mutandis 
is true of pain, it is an experience with a unique phenomenal character we abhor 
and seek to avoid.
This feeling conception of pleasures and pains is central to subjectivist accounts of 
the good and what can be called default hedonism (Feldman, 2004:109–123). On the 
felt-quality conception, when we experience pleasure we experience it as a detectable 
event or episode with a duration and an intensity that may vary over time and we can’t 
be wrong about it or its value. These episodes of pleasure thus have (in principle) an 
amount of pleasure that is measurable. And the same can be said of pain; when we 
experience paradigmatic pain, we experience it as an event or episode with a dura-
tion, and a certain intensity at each moment in time. And as with pleasure, episodes 
of pain would have an amount of pain that is in principle measurable.
6 If Eudoxus had an argument against this Cyrenaic argument, or that ruled out the conception of pleasure 
and pain as feelings, it is not recorded by Aristotle.
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The combination of the felt-quality conception of pleasure and pain, and hedon-
ism has the great advantage of simplicity when it comes to practical reasoning and 
prudence. For the default hedonist, a person’s good depends solely on whether they 
are pleased and not in pain. Hence, if we create units of measurement such as hedons 
and lupons (units of pleasure and pain respectively) and calculate net pleasure and 
pain taking into account duration and intensity of particular courses of actions or 
behaviours, those actions and behaviours that result in a higher net amount of pleas-
ure and a lower net amount of pain are rational. There are philosophers who have 
proposed that this position can be bolstered against some of the objectivists criticisms, 
by respecting other values and supporting demands for truth, ethics and sophistica-
tion in the kinds of pleasures that make up a good life, but these adjustments come 
at the cost of simplicity, and whether they succeed in strengthening the felt-quality 
conception is beyond the scope of this paper (but see Feldman, 2004:109–23).
Plato
There are a number of discussions in Plato’s dialogues about pleasure and pain, as 
a number of arguments are explored.7 But in a latter dialogue Philebus, Plato has 
Socrates arguing for a position that would place him squarely in the camp of those 
who think that even in the case of sensory pleasures and pains the pleasantness or 
painfulness is external (it is not a detectable object in the sensory experience) to the 
sensation or sensory input. Ultimately, Plato is an objectivist about the good in that 
claims about what is good can be correct or incorrect, and that the correctness of a 
claim about a person’s good is determined independently of that person’s attitudes 
and opinions (Arneson, 1999:115). And so he argues that pleasures and pains are in 
essence, perceptions: states of the ψυχή (psyche /soul /mind) with a structure like 
beliefs, desires, fears, expectations and other propositional attitudes.8
In brief, Plato developed an elaborate conception of pleasure and pain based upon 
proto-physiological ideas that associated pains and pleasures with the disruption 
and restoration of the organism’s psycho-physical constitution.9 Furthermore, he has 
Socrates argue that the psyche is responsible for guiding the body towards its good 
condition so that the human animal is a homeostatic being that has the ability to 
monitor and nurture itself. The foundation for this argument is given in the following 
statement on the nature of pleasure and pain in the Philebus:
When the natural constitution (κατὰ φύσιν) of determinate and indeterminate (πέρας 
and ἄπειρον) that forms a living organism is destroyed (φθωρά), this destruction is 
7 The Protagoras in which Socrates tries out the Hedonic Calculus, the Gorgias which introduces physi-
ological themes to the discussion, and the Republic which introduces the concept of true and false 
pleasures and argues that the philosophical life is the most pleasant.
8 See Thalberg, 1962; Penner, 1970 and Frede, 1985.
9 See Couvalis and Usher, 2005. See also Gill, 2000.
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pain, while the return towards its own nature, this general restoration from destruc-
tion is pleasure. (Phil 31c–31b, see also 35e)
A robust appreciation of what Socrates is saying here requires some knowledge 
of Plato’s metaphysical ideas, and of the cosmo-physiology of the Timaeus.10 For the 
purposes of this paper, the metaphysics can be put aside and we can just look at the 
physiological ideas. Even before Socrates’ day there were those who were interested 
in what we would call physiology and medicine (Irwin, 1992). In two later dialogues, 
Philebus and Timaeus, Plato incorporates into his own arguments the basic idea that 
living beings are composed of elements and forces in some kind of proportionate mix, 
which is dynamic and subject to fluctuation from its optimal condition. As sickness 
and health occurred when these optimal states are disrupted and restored so too (as 
suggested by Empedocles) pain and pleasure occur.11
After giving the statement above (Phil 31c–31d), Plato has Socrates give a few 
examples of pleasures and pains; Hunger is a dissolution and hence is painful, while 
eating is the restorative filling and is therefore pleasant; thirst is a drying out, but 
drinking the filling up with moisture of that which was dried up and so is pleasant; 
excessive cold is a disruption and so is painful while the warming to the right degree, 
a restoration, hence it is pleasant (Phil 31c–32b, see 47d–50d for the disruptions and 
restorations of the psyche alone, 51a–d for a description of true pleasures in which 
the disruption is not perceived but the restoration is).
However, the context of these claims and the arguments that follow point to pleas-
ures and pains actually being consequent upon the processes by which an animal is 
disturbed and restored (Evans, 2007:73). The context is that Socrates has already said 
that one of the psyche’s functions is to guide the body towards health, including heal-
ing and repair, from damage and disruption that occurs from living (Phil 29e–30b). 
The argument is that a psyche that perceives in its body damage or disruption is a 
disturbed psyche, which is motivated to restore or replenish that which has been 
destroyed, depleted and disrupted (this idea is also found in the Timaeus 86d–90d) 
(Evans, 2007:86). As the body’s optimal condition is restored from the disruption, the 
psyche perceives the restoration in the body and is itself restored from the imbalance 
created by the perception of the disturbance in the first place. It is added that both 
perceptions only occur if the disruption or restoration is significant enough that it 
causes a σεισμός (an oscillation) in the psyche (Phil 33d–34a, 43b–43c).
The initial disruption and restoration account given at 31c–31d in Philebus, is thus 
modified by an important qualification, in that both pleasure and pain are perceptions 
(αἴσθησις), they are thus psychological states; those that represent bodily damage and 
disruptions are pains, and those psychological states that represent bodily restoration 
are bodily pleasures. As essentially psychological states then they are separate and 
10 See Tracy, 1969, see also Hampton, 1990 and Burgess, 2000.
11 See Gorgias 492e–499c; Republic 583b–586c; Timaeus 64a–65b. See Gosling and Taylor, 1982 and Frede, 
1992.
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external to the states/sensations of the body and they are cognitively robust, because 
we are told that appetitive states like thirst and hunger are also non-bodily psycho-
logical states, involving memory and desire (Phil 35d–e, 34b–35d).
In the discussion on desire, Plato has Socrates say that the desiring organism is able 
to recognise the object of its desires. We can readily agree that at least from childhood 
onwards that when we feel thirsty we desire “drink”, for example. And hence we can 
see how one might claim that (in adult or mature animals at least) desire is not just 
the appreciation of lack or disruption but also includes a reference for the object of 
replenishment and restoration (Phil 35b–d). And Plato is arguing that an organism 
can be motivated to pursue the object of restoration only when/if it has had contact 
with that thing to give content, and thereby direction to the organisms intentions 
(Evans, 2007:88).
How does Plato think organisms come to make the connection between the dis-
turbance and the object of restoration? In the passage 34c–35d of Philebus, he has 
Socrates explain that it cannot be the body, instead Socrates thinks that the desiring 
organism connects with the object, by representing it as the aim for action, which it 
can only do by the use of memory (Phil 35c–d). It is thus made clear that memories, 
which are also states of the psyche, are bearers of representational content, the content 
being an object to be pursued given the circumstances the animal currently finds itself 
in (Phil 38b–39c) (Evans, 2007:89).
The upshot of all these moves is that for Plato even sensory pleasures and pains, 
become like beliefs, desires, hopes and fears, in the sense that they are mental states 
of the sort we call propositional attitudes (more recently expressed by some as rep-
resentational states) (Phil 37a–37c).12 In the case of pain for example, the psyche 
doesn’t just perceive the disturbance in the body, but it makes a connection between 
the relevant bodily disturbance (sensory input), and the relevant object of repair, 
replenishment or restoration, and in this way brings with it a motivation to pursue 
the means to restoration for that particular disturbance. And this means that bodily 
pains are in essence content bearing psychological disruptions, which inform the animal 
in what way its body has been damaged, and motivate the animal to fix itself (Evans, 
2007:83). And mutatis mutandis for pleasure, it is also a contentful mental state, its 
functional role is to inform the organism that its disruption is being restored, so that 
next time it is similarly disturbed it is motivated and remembers the circumstances 
and objects of that restoration.
Contemporary arguments and desiderata
How does the felt-quality conception like that of the Cyrenaics’, and the attitudinal 
account involving propositional attitudes of Plato, stand in contemporary philosophi-
cal debates? Plato’s conception is among friends, as there has been a popular strand 
12 Matt Evans provides an examination of limitations of other perceptual theories, which may have led 
Plato to take a representationalist position (Evans, 2007: 81–83). See also Usher, 2012: Chapters 10, 13.
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of the philosophy of mind that has embraced perceptual models about pain and 
which invoke representational content. Furthermore, externalist conceptions like 
Plato’s are doing better at answering contemporary desiderata about pleasure and 
pain, with regard to non-phenomenality, motivation and opposite valances (Bain & 
Brady, 2014:3.1).
For contemporary perceptualists who embrace representationalism, to be in pain 
is to be having an experience which represents a part of your body as damaged or 
undergoing some kind of disturbance, in the same way that you might visually have 
an experience that represents a red tomato before you.13 The claim is not that pain is 
a sign from which damage might be inferred, but that pain notifies the organism of 
damage in a way like that in which visual experiences notify the organism of shapes 
and colours. Consequently, even if one balks at the suggestion that pain experiences 
are beliefs, it is possible to argue that they do have truth-conditions, being true (or 
veridical) if the represented bodily location really is damaged, and false if it is not, as 
in cases of referred pain, and the aptly named phantom-limb pains (Bain & Brady, 
2014:3.2).14
And perceptualism of this kind fits with contemporary representationalist accounts 
of phenomenal consciousness in which an experience’s phenomenal character is or 
supervenes on its content (Tye, 1995; Byrne, 2001). So for example, to have a “red 
feeling” is to experience a representation of something red in the environment. This 
aspect of representationalism is perhaps more controversial, and brings us to the 
consideration of some contemporary desiderata with regards to pleasure and pain, 
and non-phenomenality.
I described before, one of the oldest and most persuasive ideas about pleasure and 
pains: that sensory pleasure and sensory pain are “feelings” that are an integral part 
of the very phenomenology of a pleasant sensation or painful sensation. In the pre-
vious century, deep philosophical problems with the nature of phenomenal objects 
emerged, as they don’t fit our contemporary naturalism. Furthermore, some influ-
ential arguments were made that there isn’t an introspectively discoverable quality 
that unites all pleasures (or all pains too, potentially, though I’ll leave pain aside for 
the moment) (Sidgwick, 1907; Feldman, 1997). So even leaving aside the ontological 
problems with phenomenal qualities, there was what is called the heterogeneity prob-
lem; how could all those very different things called pleasant (reading, swimming, 
listening, etc.), cause the same thing (pleasure) in every case? And it was argued that 
when you introspect on pleasant experiences (of which there are a seemingly infinite 
variety), you can find no phenomenal quality, in virtue of which they are all pleasant.15
13 See Armstrong, 1962 and 1968; Tye, 1995; Bain, 2003, for Perceptualist arguments and representation-
alism in pain perception. For an argument against pain having representational content see McGinn, 
1996:8–9.
14 Although I haven’t discussed it here, in earlier papers I have explored Plato’s arguments that pleasures 
and pains can be false in a number of different senses, see Couvalis and Usher, 2003 and Frede, 1985.
15 This does not mean that these experiences are not pleasant, but that they don’t share a phenomenal 
feature that is their pleasantness (Bain & Brady, 2014:3.1).
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Externalist theories are better placed to answer these concerns. Firstly, the nature 
of the phenomenal qualities is a moot point if one takes the position that the essence 
of pleasures and pains is not in each’s own particular phenomenal qualities. And 
explaining how the diversity of things found pleasant all cause the same phenomenal 
quality (the heterogeneity of pleasures problem), is less of a problem for attitudinal 
theories. On versions of externalism, such as Plato’s attitudinal account, what unifies 
the diversity of particular pleasures and particular pains, is the attitude implicit in 
the perception of negative and positive conditions.
Now I suggested that the externalist position is supposed, mutatis mutandis to 
apply to sensory pain. But with regards to sensory pain (paradigmatic pain) the 
internalists might have thought they were on unassailable ground. Who could deny 
that to experience pain from an injury to the body from say a clumsy knife stroke, 
is to experience a particularly awful sensation with an attention-grabbing phenom-
enal quality. And yet, repeated physiological studies on pain, have shown that pain 
sensations and painfulness can come apart, or in other words that it is possible to 
experience sensory pain that is not itself unpleasant or painful. People with congeni-
tal conditions or brain injuries can experience what is called pain asymbolia, where 
they clearly identify noxious stimuli as pain, but they insist it doesn’t bother them 
(Grahek, 2001). This phenomenon has been taken as good evidence against the felt-
quality conception; if even in the case of paradigmatic pain (sensory pain from cuts 
burns and bruises that have pain sensations), it can be shown that the painfulness 
(the phenomenal quality of hurting) is not a component of pain sensations, then the 
internalists’ hitherto strongest example appears on shaky grounds (Usher, 2012).
So in this important regard, Plato’s argument fits well with contemporary percep-
tualism. In response to the internalist and felt-quality views which can be found in the 
Cyrenaic’s arguments and in the mouths of protagonists like Callicles and Protarchus 
in his dialogues, Plato never seems too concerned about the nature of qualitative or 
phenomenal properties. This suggests that when it comes to understanding pleasure 
and pain, he thinks that what is important is its attitudinal nature, not its qualita-
tive or phenomenal characters.16 For Plato such a conception not only fits within 
his greater metaphysical and physiological framework, but also it gives pains and 
pleasures the properties they must have if they are to play a robust role in practical 
reasoning under an objectivist conception of the good. If pain and pleasure are to act 
as an explanation of a rational action within an objectivist account, then their mean-
ing something, i.e., their having content that can be correct or incorrect, makes them 
much more suitable candidates for rational analysis, than brute feelings we just like 
or dislike (Evans, 2007:90).
To be clear Plato’s conception and those like it do not entail that pains, or any 
other psychological states (pleasures), do not have non-representational qualitative 
16 “Since he holds that bodily pains just are attitudes of a certain kind, one can defend his account without 
ever abandoning or minimising one’s commitment to the existence of qualitative states. One need only 
insist that pains have no determinate qualitative character essential to them qua pains” (Evans, 2007: 92).
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properties, only that, whatever qualitative properties a pain (or pleasure) might have, 
they are not essential to it (Evans, 2007:72–93). Hence, the conception is clearly 
opposed to the sort of subjectivist and internalist view I argued was held by Aristip-
pus and the Cyrenaics, which took the essence of pleasantness and painfulness to be 
non-representational qualitative properties present in every and all cases of pleasure, 
or pain, that we cannot be wrong about.
A second desiderata in this area concerns the motivating power of pleasures and 
pains. Consider the pain or unpleasantness of jumping into a very cold lake. It defen-
sibly motivates you to get out of the water quickly, defensibly because the motiva-
tion might be overridden by a stronger motivation to prove how tough you are, 
for example. The point is that the pain has a motivational character inherent in its 
unpleasantness and that it is independent of further desires (Bain & Brady, 2014:3.1). 
Hence, unpleasant pains, belong to a special category of motivations, motivations that 
figure in rationalising explanations of action (Bain & Brady, 2014:3.1). The idea is that 
when we explain the behaviour of scrambling out of the freezing water in terms of the 
unpleasantness of pain, we are not just giving a reason that the person’s body moved 
(as the dropping of a coin into one side of the scales was the reason that it descended), 
but we are also giving a reason or reasons for which a person moved it, to wit: a mental 
episode in which the action seems rational to the person, and accordingly motivating 
them to perform it (Bain & Brady, 2014:3.3).
Plato is among those who extend the claim mutatis mutandis, to pleasures, and 
unpleasures. In investing pleasures and pains with content/meaning he can now argue 
that pleasures and pains are intrinsically motivating in that they, of themselves, provide 
motivating (albeit defeasible) reasons for their subjects to act (Aydede, 2014:123). In 
contrast on Cyrenaic type felt-quality conceptions, there is at best a reliable but con-
tingent connection between pleasantness and painfulness and motivation as it is just a 
brute fact that the perception of a phenomenal quality motivates (Aydede, 2014:123).
Finally a brief word on the issue of opposing (positive/negative) valences. Here 
again, we find attitudinal conceptions like Plato’s are better placed to answer these 
questions about the nature of pleasure and pain. On the assumption that unpleasant-
ness is the opposite of pleasantness, if not pain itself, attitudinal theories can account 
for this by positing opposite attitudes (e.g. liking versus disliking, or attraction ver-
sus aversion), or same attitudes but opposite content (desiring versus desiring not) 
(Aydede, 2014:124). Again, in contrast, if pleasantness is just a contentless phenom-
enal sensory quality, in what sense could it have an opposite?
The externalist, attitudinal conceptions of pleasure and pain like Plato’s are better 
placed to answer these desiderata. Of course, there are some significant problems for 
perceptual views like the ones I have outlined and some challenging retorts by felt-
quality adherents. In particular, there is a problem with the claim that beliefs (content) 
can, by themselves, motivate. Humean arguments along the lines that the possession 
of indicative content of an experience, whether visual experience or a pain, cannot 
account for it to be pleasant, unpleasant, or motivational remain problematic for those 
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taking the attitudinal line (Bain&Brady, 2014:3.2).17 I cannot go into the attempted 
defences against these problems in this paper, suffice to say there remain some chal-
lenging problems in this field.
In conclusion to this exploration I return to my original question which was what 
kinds of things pleasures and pains are, with a view to understanding the place of 
pleasure in the good life. If the Cyrenaic conception of the nature of pleasure and pain 
I outlined earlier is rejected, then that would pose significant problems for subjectivist 
accounts of the good and the hedonic calculus. If in essence, pleasures and pains are 
what they are because of their respective content, because of their meaning, then we 
can evaluate that content for its prudential value, and weigh it against other values 
we might hold, in a much more robust way than we can if they are representationally 
blank, content-less, subjective feelings of homogenised value.
In the literature the argument is often made against the hedonist that were it pos-
sible, via “experience machines” or lobotomy-like surgical procedures to have a life 
of permanent bliss, at the price that you would be unconscious of the world, most 
of us would reject such an option as a good life, for ourselves and others. The atti-
tudinal conception of pleasures and pains is able to account for that rejection while 
still respecting the value of pleasure and pain. The pleasures and pains that “fit” with 
our other values and goals are welcome components of the good life, and others, no 
matter how intense they may be, will be trivial at best. Such distinctions are difficult 
to make if you take the feeling conception of pleasures and pains.
Thus, if you accept that there is content or meaning at the core of pleasures and 
pains, and that that content can be false, mistaken, irrational, etc., pursuing a basic 
hedonic calculus of the Cyrenaic sort would be imprudent. Recognising that we 
can be falsely pleased, and falsely pained, so to speak, pushes us towards objectivist 
conceptions of the good, and the recognition that other values are important to the 
good life than just having a certain mental state or quality of experience. A rational 
agent would choose for herself and others a life that respected other values, to the 
extent that it might contain less than maximum pleasure, and included some pains 
over a life that just contained the maximum amount of a pleasant mental state, and a 
minimal amount of a painful one.
17 David Hume [1739], A Treatise on Human Understanding, eds L. A. Selby-Briggs and P. H. Nidditch, 
2nd edition Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996.
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